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i
Abstract
This study examines the role of politics in the removal of the 106-foot tall San Clemente
Dam. The removal project and negotiations provide a case study of the contemporary
phenomenon of dam removal. My analysis joins a growing body of social science
literature on the social, political, and human dimensions of removal. The San Clemente
Dam, which impounded the Carmel River near Monterey, California, was removed in
2015, the largest such project completed in California. Drawing on political ecology and
science and technology studies, and using a mixed qualitative approach, I assess both the
role of politics in shaping the project and the politics affected through or by the removal.
I use a broad, historically attentive analysis of the region to contextualize the political
elements of the project. My findings demonstrate and focus on several political
dimensions of the removal project, including funding, micro-political strategies, and the
prioritizing of particular ecosystem functions and services in the post-removal landscape.
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Introduction
Once an impressive centerpiece to regional development and a proud achievement
of pre-depression civil engineering, the San Clemente Dam reached the end of its
structural lifespan as a used-up impediment. Located on the Carmel River near
California’s Central Coast, the dam formerly impounded 1500 acre-feet of water and
helped supply water to the Monterey Peninsula. When the dam was finally removed in
2015, the reservoir contained only a minute fraction of its former volume. Behind the
dam’s 106-foot concrete arch rested some 2.5 million cubic yards of accumulated
sediment, a problem at the center of a long-running compendium of social, political, and
ecological issues. When it finally came down, the San Clemente was the largest dam ever
removed in the state of California and among the most expensive of such projects in the
nation.
The San Clemente dam removal (officially, the Carmel River Reroute and San
Clemente Dam Removal) was unique not only in size and cost, but was also notable for
the novel approach and design it employed. Given the massive sediment load behind the
dam, and the consequences of removing or releasing that sediment downriver, the
stakeholders and decision-makers chose instead to leave the sediment in place,
sequestering it in the former riverbed. To do so, the Carmel River was rerouted 450 feet
through an intervening ridge and into the bed of nearby San Clemente Creek.
Accomplishing this diversion required extensive engineering and channel design, but
allowed the sediment to remain in place, even after the tall dam was removed.
The events that precipitated the removal efforts of the San Clemente, and the
landscape that resulted from that novel feat of engineering, are at the heart of this study.
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Specifically, and with attention to multiple factors, I explore the role and work of politics,
both in the removal process and in the landscape it yielded. While the decades-long
project to bring down the dam ostensibly considered what to do with a riverine
ecosystem, the process and decision-making played out across a social and political
landscape.
Dams sit at the nexus of environment and technology. As material objects, they
transform something categorically natural (a river) into something transferable, useable
(drinking water in this case) and technological. The human purposes and ends for which
dams are built give light to their position as inherently political object; in their massive
and seemingly immovable state, they project those inherent politics or values into the
future. Indeed, the sheer mass of large dams ensures some lasting impacts on
communities around them.
Because of these impacts, when dams (like the San Clemente) reach the inevitable
end of their service life, the proportions of the questions at hand ensure an outsized
significance. Like all artifacts of infrastructure, dams, and the systems they comprise,
eventually decay, prompting, at the very least, the question “what should be done?”, not
to mention issues of “by whom”, and “how.” Answering or addressing these questions is
itself a political, value-laden, and socially shaped process. Bureaucrats, engineers, and a
sometimes-bewildering array of stakeholders and actors are asked or compelled to assist
the re-appraisal of infrastructure and the creation of a new (if “restored”) landscape.
From this process emerges the post-removal landscape, which in the case of the San
Clemente comprised a rerouted stretch of river and dramatic engineering of the
surrounding ecosystem. While this production (the remaking of the physical landscape) is
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less obviously the result of highly technical engineering, the post-removal landscape may
often be the outcome of a far more involved decision-making process than the
construction of the dam that preceded it. In this way, the artifact of a dam removal is akin
to a dam itself in its ability to assist, enact, or project the values of its designers.
The ideas presented above comprise the heart of this study: that dams project
politics, that removals are socially and politically shaped, and that the post-removal
landscape also projects the politics inherent in its design. I investigate and explain the
role of politics in the removal of the San Clemente Dam, addressing my primary research
question: how do politics figure into dam removal? Subsequently, I investigate the
following secondary questions:
1. How are politics embedded in the post-removal landscape?
2. How are politics represented in the discourses surrounding the removal of
the San Clemente Dam?
3. How did these political discourses shape or enable the dam removal
project?
In examining dam removal and how it may be shaped by or imbued with politics, I
acknowledge that politics alone is unlikely to account for the outcome of a removal
project. Rather, politics is one amongst a host of drivers. In exploring this key variable
(politics), I consider the full spectrum of agencies, forces, and factors at work in the
removal process. In theoretical terms, this manifests as an attention to what Sarah
Pritchard (2011) has called the enviro-technical system; “historically and culturally
specific configurations of intertwined ‘ecological’ and ‘technological’ systems, which
may be composed of artifacts, practices, people, institutions, and ecologies” (19). In more
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general terms, I draw primarily on scholarship within political ecology and science and
technology studies (STS). Each academic body brings clarifying advantages—political
ecology with its attention to the interaction of environmental change and politics, STS in
its social constitution of artifacts of technology. The intersection of both frameworks
proves to be a fruitful space of inquiry, a theoretical wellspring.
I begin this study by establishing the theoretical lens that directs my investigation,
and continue with a literature review outlining several key fields that have informed my
findings. I provide an overview of the relevant bodies of work within STS and political
ecology, and pertinent multidisciplinary works that address the subject of dams,
infrastructure, and environmental restoration, particularly within the realm of social
science.
Within my theory-focused discussion of STS, I outline both the general utility of
STS as an analytic framework, as well as several specific concepts that inform my
research and analysis. Broadly, STS informs this study through its attention to the
embroilment of technologies within social networks and systems and the material
significance of artifacts of technology such as dams. The field has seen a recent turn
towards infrastructure (see, for instance, Crow-Miller et al. 2017). I also draw several key
concepts from scholars aligned with STS, specifically citing literature on obduracy,
techno-politics, and the enviro-technical system, which serve to clarify and explicate the
results of my research.
Similarly to STS, political ecology offers a context for this study, and contributes
key concepts. This study aligns with political ecology in its attention to the political
origins of environmental change. Moreover, within this thesis I emulate classic works of
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political ecology (see Hecht 1985, for instance), opting for an ideographic study and
focusing on contingency and complexity with respect to the San Clemente Dam removal,
rather than searching for commonalities with other removals. I attempt to produce a
thoroughly “regional political ecology,” answering a call for work which focuses on the
situated uniqueness and intricacies of place (Walker 2003).
To summarize my literature review, I outline a theoretical framework appropriate
for analyzing the ways in which politics figure into (a specific) dam removal. Namely,
that by assessing the enviro-technical regime within which a dam, its removal efforts, and
the post-removal landscapes are situated, we might gain insight both into the work of
those political forces to shape and allow removal, and also into the political efficacy of
the landscape or artifacts that remains when the dam is gone.
Subsequent to the literature review, I provide a general overview of the methods
involved in this study. The data for this analysis was generated through seven qualitative,
semi-structured interviews completed between 2016 and 2017. The interview data is
complimented by a body of archival research. Although the original design of this study
focused heavily on performing discourse analysis with transcribed interviews, the final
analysis rests on a detailed understanding of the historical conditions and regimes which
led towards removal. Nevertheless, the ten-plus hours of interview recordings were
transcribed and analyzed for the presence of political or politicized discourses.
My analysis plays out across three subsections, each oriented toward a different
topic and presenting a roughly chronological account of the San Clemente Dam and its
removal. This system of organization allows for the presentation of a detailed history of
the enviro-technical system, the dam itself, its removal, and the removal’s aftermath.
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The first analytic subsection (“Outlining the System”) provides historic and
geographic context for the 2015 removal project. In describing the enviro-technical
system within which the San Clemente dam was situated, I focus on the mutually
intertwined histories of water and development on the Monterey Peninsula throughout the
twentieth century. Understanding of the broader, statewide water-history provides context
and explanatory potential, both historically and in my analysis, to the system and regime
that emerged with respect to the San Clemente dam. I also include in this section a brief
analysis of the intertwined, co-mingled, and co-produced elements and phenomena that
directly contributed to the obduracy of the dam during and after its service life.
In the second subsection (“Lead-up to Removal”), my analysis shifts towards the
conditions and motivations that led to inertia for the removal project. This subsection
provides policy background and an overview of the constellation of actors involved in the
removal, particularly the biogeophysical phenomenon (fire, sedimentation) that
precipitated removal, critical regulatory and policy junctures (including seismic surveys
and mandates by various state and federal agencies), and a dynamic suite of stakeholders
(the dam owner, National Marine Fisheries Service, and local advocacy groups).
Having established the conditions precipitating the removal decision, the next
subsection (“Funding”) describes a number of critical junctures and events that illustrate
the local enviro-technical system, pertinent political actions and outcomes, and
challenges in the work of translating dam removal (described as a technology) to the
Carmel river. This section describes the mechanics of funding the project and explores
the issues surrounding that process, which constituted a critical juncture in its political
implications and outcomes. I close by describing the coalescent design of the removal
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and reroute.
The final subsection looks directly at the post-removal landscape as a novel
landscape and an artifact of technology. I argue that the landscape and its design
demonstrate the work of certain value-laden processes, particularly concerning
anadromous fish and sediment. Furthermore, I suggest that the form the removal took
(that of reroute and sediment storage) is tied to the altered, but nevertheless recognizable
and ongoing enviro-technical system of the region. The physical artifact of the dam
removal within the regional enviro-technical system, the post removal landscape, shows
evidence of the discourses of liability and risk that were identified in my qualitative
interviews. These discourses shaped the removal process, illustrate the pre-existing
enviro-technical regime, and demonstrate the work of politics through technology,
wherein even the post-removal landscape contributes to the continued political order and
status-quo of the Monterey Peninsula.
This study closes with a summary and integration of the concepts presented in the
analysis. In particular, I stress the ways in which my theoretical framework draws
attention to and helps to locate pertinent political issues with respect to the San Clemente
dam removal and reroute. I also show that the vignettes and objects of analysis
comprising the key subject matter of the removal offered in my study, while far from
exhaustive, serve to demonstrate the ways in which politics shaped and were imbricated
throughout the project. In closing, based on my findings I offer additional directions, both
topical and theoretical, that future research might take on the matters of dam removal in
general, and the San Clemente case in particular.
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Literature Review and Key Theoretical Arguments
Overview
This project is informed most significantly by the fields of political ecology and
science and technology studies (STS). The critical nature of political ecology coupled
with the attention to the politics of physical artifacts of technology inherent to technopolitics, a sub-field of STS, sets the stage for the rich conceptual framework within which
I situate this research. My research also draws on literature beyond these fields,
consulting general scholarship on rivers, water management, dams, and environmental
restoration in order to gain a more thorough picture of the factors influencing dam
removal.

Political Ecology
Since its inception in the 1980s, political ecology has developed considerable
breadth in terms of scholars and subject matter. Paul Robbins (2004) offers several keen
insights into the nature of political ecology, first arguing that political ecology is as much
a way of doing research as it is a field of study, and further emphasizing that what defines
this way of doing research is what it is not, namely “apolitical” ecology. An apolitical
ecology takes for granted concepts such as nature, scarcity, and even politics (defined as
a formal, legislated field), ignoring the influence of social factors, marginalization, and
political economy on issues including landscape change, environmental degradation, and
access to resources. Similarly, James McCarthy (2002, 1283) argues that it is the
presence of a set of themes within individual case studies that “defines political ecology
more than any consistent theoretical or methodological approach to them.” So, while the
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field is not marked by a predefined way of doing things, it is unified by a genealogy of
themes and ideas that underlie its structure.
Geographically, the San Clemente Dam Removal project falls within the American
West, specifically within a relatively affluent part of California. This is a somewhat
atypical location for study in this field, as historically, the majority of political ecology
fieldwork has focused on rural issues in developing countries. Nevertheless, several
prominent political ecologists have argued for the place and role of a so-called First
World political ecology. Walker (2003), Schroeder (2005), and McCarthy (2002) all
point out that the tools, concepts, and methods of political ecology developed abroad
could (and perhaps should) be translated into a first-world context. In his analysis of the
Wise Use Movement, which occurred during the 1980s and 1990s in the American West,
McCarthy illustrates how in focusing their studies on other parts of the world, academics
overlooked the analogous struggles occurring locally.
Beyond political ecology (and in its disciplinary antecedent, cultural ecology),
Bernard Nietschmann (2001) conveys a similar message through his conceptual “Beverly
Hills Geographer.” Nietschmann posits that the process of social science research and the
relationship between researcher and “subject” commonly mirrors existing social
dynamics and power differentials. Academic researchers, the critique implies, are
disinclined to examine, or dissuaded from examining individuals or communities of a
higher class or social standing. This insight inspires my own work and I hope to bring to
bear a similarly critical lens on topics and geographies that have generally received less
attention within the political ecology literature.
The Carmel River basin and surrounding communities clearly fit within the
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context of a first-world political ecology. Furthermore, the communities in proximity to
the dam, as well as those served by the private water company that owned the dam, are
generally affluent. The use of political ecology in this instance is therefore somewhat
novel, as it has been applied more commonly in studies of marginality and development.
This application is nevertheless fitting, as the fundamental concepts of political ecology
do not suddenly cease to apply where privilege increases. By focusing on political
ecology as a way of doing research, I hope to bring a critical perspective to bear on this
novel case study and explicitly address the socioeconomic context of some of
California’s most expensive real estate.
In keeping with the genealogy of political ecology research, this study employs a
broad, generally conventional definition of politics. Peter Walker provides a useful
summary of politics as “the panoply of ‘processes and mechanisms’ through which power
is circulated and wielded“ (2007, 364). I examine politics as something that shaped the
San Clemente dam removal and also as an outcome of the same process. Walker’s
definition is necessarily flexible enough to encompass the multitude of forms through
which politics figure into dam removal. The limits of this definition and approach to
politics (and subsequent opportunities for theoretical development) are discussed at the
end of my conclusion chapter.

Dams and Dam Removal
Dams span the physical and conceptual space between nature and infrastructure. As
integral objects in water management, they are embedded within complex systems,
linking people, technology and natural elements. A wide range of recent scholars
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(Evenden 2009, Bijker 2007, Brooks 2009, Kaika 2006, White 2011) have examined how
dams are a physical manifestation of politics built into the landscape, but the process of
dam removal has, until recently, not received the same critical academic attention (see
Grabowski et al. 2017 for some compelling recent work). Given a recent spate of highprofile dam removals across the United States (see Blumm and Erickson 2012, for
example) and the likelihood that more will soon follow (McCully 1996), the removal of
dams constitutes a propitious area of inquiry.
While critically oriented social science analyses of dam removal have begun to
emerge only recently, biophysical and geophysical assessments of removals have
proliferated (see, for instance, Doyle et al. 2003, Doyle et al. 2005, Hart et al. 2002,
Lafrenz et al. 2013, Magilligan et al. 2016, Michel et al. 2011, Stanley et al. 2003). The
wide variety of studies conducted across the physical and biological sciences
demonstrates both the continued development of knowledge, as well as the fundamental
complexity of the processes at hand. Early notable work on dam removal emerging from
within the social sciences showed primarily structural and disciplinary approaches to
understanding, with informative pieces published in legal journals (Blumm and Erickson
2012) and policy venues (Lowry 2003). Elsewhere, a small but growing number of
studies and articles dwelt more broadly on issues of power, politics, discourse and social
constructions (see Gosnell and Kelly 2010, Fox et al. 2016, Magilligan et al. 2017).
Still, the relative paucity of work on removals contrasts with significant literature
about the broad mosaic of political positions represented, enhanced, and enacted through
the construction of large dams and waterworks (see Brooks 2009, McCully 1996, Reisner
1993, White 1996). Political ecology has shown many promising examples of scholarship
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focusing on dams as sites of politically charged conflicts over the environment, changing
landscapes, and control of natural resources (see, for instance, Kaika 2006, Sneddon
2015). Simultaneously, the nexus of political ecology and STS has emerged as an
important space of inquiry, offering insight into the means by which water-related
material technologies—“things of water management,” as Bijker (2007) has put it in
another scholarly context—are positioned by politics and do political work (Bichsel
2016, Carrol 2012, Carse 2012, Loftus et al. 2016, Molle et al. 2009, Sneddon and Fox
2011). Kate Meehan’s work (2013, 2014) offers compelling insights about the variegated
geographies resulting from different apparatus of water provision in Mexico. As she has
argued, objects are “full force” in their social or political efficacy (see also Shaw and
Meehan 2013).
The bulk of scholarship on dams within critically oriented social sciences has most
commonly examine the building of dams and the impacts which stem from their
construction (see McCully 1996, Khagram 2004), some recent work notwithstanding
(see, for instance, Sneddon 2015). Inherent in my focus on dam removal is the notion that
to consider dams as “full force” (Shaw and Meehan 2013), which is to say in real
cognizance of their social and political importance and impact, it is worth dwelling on the
entire span of their existence. Dam removal—or more generally what is to be done with
dams as they age, deteriorate, or grow in obsolescence—poses significant questions about
the social and political work of dams. Removal is not a discrete historic and geographic
phenomenon, something simply happening at this moment, but a set of interrelated issues
that can be studied in concert with, and in the context of dams and their general politics.
Simultaneously, there remains the contemporary significance of removals, a key feature
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in comprehending their impacts, effects, and ramifications. The recent frequency of large
dam removals in the United States, and elsewhere (see Lejon et al. 2009), provides
contextual details and offers some explanation as to the how and why of individual
removals.

Environmental Restoration
Although the present phenomenon of dam removal is necessarily multi-dimensional
and multi-causal, involving infrastructural and environment concerns, technology,
identity, and aesthetics, the practice and science of environmental restoration has held
special sway in contemporary removal projects. Restoration is generally a young field
(see Jordan 2010) and it is not uncontested (Lave et al. 2010). As the techniques and
understanding of the processes involved with returning to a landscape some of its “prehuman” characteristics have developed in sophistication, critiques have emerged from
within and without the field. Clewell and Aronson (2006) demonstrate the social shaping
of restoration projects and practice, and describe the values that motivate or drive them.
Davis and Slobodkin (2004) argue that “defining restoration goals and objectives is
fundamentally a value-based, not scientific, activity” (1). These critiques are in keeping
with significant work in science and technology studies and political ecology, which
takes to task the entanglement of scientific endeavors and social forces. Forsyth (2002)
has notably drawn attention to the “various ways in which environmental science and
political processes are mutually embedded” (266), arguing that the line between science
and policy (or in this case, science and something more broadly social) is not so distinct.
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Of particular relevance to this analysis is the arguably recursive relationship
between environmental restoration and dam removal. In the United States, there has been
significant growth in the number of firms with the technical qualifications, experience,
and know-how to effectively (in terms of cost and ecology) take part in dam removal
projects. Environmental restoration is notable as a field in that private industry has shown
a significant amount of influence over the production and dissemination of scientific
knowledge (see Lave et al. 2010). While dam removal projects are facilitated by science
and technical experience, numerous removals over the past several decades have pushed
firms to develop a more robust understanding of to restore or otherwise alter a river
within acceptable standards. These suppositions were confirmed in the course of this
study, in interviews with practitioners at a leading firm for removal design and
engineering.

Science and Technology Studies
The recursive nature of this relationship (wherein removals have shaped the
understanding and knowledge of restoration and this knowledge in turn facilitates
restoration) speaks to a novel take on analysis of dam removal, the view of dam removal
as a technology. In describing dam removal with respect to this view, I find it helpful to
invoke Allenby and Sarewitz’s (2011) conceptualization of technology as “cause and
effect machines, linking a human intent to a particular consequence via the embedded
function of the technology” (36). The technology of dam removal is therefore composed
of various practices, techniques, and systems, which facilitate the landscape
transformation. This technology is characterized by careful attention to such details as the
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management of sediment, intricacies of habitat design, and revegetation.
The technology of dam removal is specifically a technology of practice,
differentiated from material technologies. Microprocessors, automobiles, and the printing
press are all easy to recognize as examples of technology, in part because of their
material nature. Technologies of practice may lack the same concrete form, but
chemotherapy, automobile repair, and bookbinding are all useful examples of technology
as practice. Categorizing dam removal as a technology highlights the human and social
nature of the intended effects of the technology. Unlike dam failure or collapse, dam
removal is intentional, directed, and dependent on specialized skills and knowledge. This
categorization also emphasizes the role of expert knowledge of the technology. Lave et
al. (2010) demonstrate the power and politics associated with expert knowledge in their
analysis of Rosgen methods of river restoration. Their focus on the production of
knowledge and role of experts provides a model for my study of dam removal.
Treating removal as a technology also draws attention to the process of
translation, where technologies are applied or installed in new settings. Antina Von
Schnitzler’s work (2013) on electrical and water meters in South Africa highlights the
social and political struggles accompanying the implementation of a given technology, in
this case prepaid meters, to a new place. Translating a technology to a different social and
political context may also involve significant changes to the technology itself. In the case
of the San Clemente Dam, the work of bringing dam removal (as a technology of
practice) to the Carmel River did not end when the various stakeholders agreed to move
forward with removal as a viable option. Instead, the process of translating the
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technology to this next context involved years of negotiations and a myriad of technical
adjustments to the process and project.
A corollary to this lens on dam removal is the understanding of the post-removal
landscape as an artifact of technology, an intricately planned assembly of “causes” or
component parts (rocks, concrete, soils, water) in service of particular (socially or
politically determined) “effects,” often including the restoration of particular ecosystem
functions (see, for instance, Magilligan et al. 2016) as well as social goals (Fox et al.
2016). These social or political goals might include the maintenance of historically
significant river features (see, again, Fox et al. 2016), the recovery of threatened or
endangered species (see Hatten et al. 2016), or the facilitation of riverine recreation (for a
popular example see Gorthy 2018).
This comingling of technology and environment is sympathetic to a more material
view of dams as links between nature and infrastructure. The landscapes resulting from a
dam’s impoundment fall neatly into the rubric of “novel ecosystems” (Hobbes et al.
2009) while the services they render speak to their infrastructural role. The recent
proliferation of social studies of infrastructure (see, for example, Crow-Miller et al. 2017)
follows older scholarship examining the intertwined roles of nature and infrastructure
(White 1996, Cronon 2009, Pritchard 2004). The work of Ashley Carse (2012), who
demonstrates the ways in which seemingly “natural” environments are enrolled in
projects of infrastructure, holds special relevance.
Studies of this nature stress the varied components of systems of infrastructure. In
recent years, a number of related frameworks have emerged or gained popularity, which
grapple with the work of numerous human and nonhuman actors in producing, mediating,
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and shaping reality. Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005), Socio-Ecological Systems
(Cote and Nightingale 2012), and Jane Bennet’s “congregational understanding of
agency” (2009, 20) all offer a means of exploring interrelationships between seemingly
disparate actors, agents, or components. Among these approaches, concepts from
environmental history of technology offer particular advantages for conceptualizing dam
removal. Specifically, the work of Sarah Pritchard yields the “enviro-technical system”
(2011), a flexible, fitting interpretive mechanism utilized in this study.
In Confluence (2011), her environmental history of the Rhone River, Sarah
Pritchard articulates a vision for the analysis of an enviro-technical system. Building on
Thomas Hughes’ concept of the eco-technical environment, Pritchard describes envirotechnical systems as “historically and culturally specific configurations of intertwined
‘ecological’ and ‘technological’ systems, which may be composed of artifacts, practices,
people, institutions, and ecologies” (19). Pritchard goes on to highlight the porous nature
of these systems: elements have a way of finding their way in and out of the system.
Pritchard iterates that the enviro-technical system framework is conceptualized
with the “enviro-technical regime,” which emphasizes the historically contingent (and
ultimately political) development of the system. The regime reminds us that the
conditions, components, and attributes of a system do not merely exist, nor do they
simply arise, but they are the result of specific, interrelated (though not always
proximate) events and shaping-forces operating on sometimes-broad timescales. This is
not to argue that the differing frameworks or terms in the nexus of
systems/networks/assemblages have failed to take a historical view. Even within the
microcosm of studies involving water and infrastructure, but nominally considered
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outside the discipline of environmental history, there exist a notable variety of strong
scholarly contributions taking a historic perspective (see, for example, Sneddon 2015,
Berry 2014). Rather, the enviro-technical regime is pertinent in that it places emphasis on
historic contingency, implying that a snapshot perspective of the network is as limiting as
a perspective that assumes that the system is closed. Concurrently, the regime precludes
deductions or conclusions that might consider the “final” stage of the system to be a
teleological endpoint.
Social history of technology, and STS more generally, is replete with examples of
the contingency of present networks. Thomas Parker Hughes (1993) and Weibe Bijker
(2007), offer compelling examples of this, demonstrating that technology does not merely
come into being, but is constantly shaped and remade. Elsewhere, the historical literature
has focused on the intertwined roles that technology and the environment occupy in the
co-production of present environmental conditions, socio-natures, and novel landscapes
(Evenden 2004, White 1996). Dams, and their removal, demand a similar, perhaps
heightened attention to historic contingency, time, and the specific regimes into and by
which they were constructed. As Chris Sneddon reminds us “every large dam erected in
the twentieth century has a socioecological and ideological influence that far outlives the
expertise and political aims that produced it” (2015, 18-19). In other words, dams,
particularly large dams, exist on timescales that outlast human lives and, perhaps, the
systems into which they were built.
This ability for dams to translocate values and politics through time speaks to
obduracy, a key concept from STS that informs my analysis of the San Clemente dam
removal. Conceptually, obduracy describes resistance to change as manifest in a
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technological artifact or system, as well as the means by which those same artifacts and
systems translate social values through time (Bijker 1997). This second characteristic of
obduracy is described by Bruno Latour (1992) in his discussion of the “hardness” of
objects. His work is echoed in part by Hughes (1987) who argues that “durable physical
artifacts project into the future the socially constructed characteristics acquired in the past
when they were designed” (77). These artifacts, written with politics, are also resistant to
change. For example, Langdon Winner (1980) describes overpasses, designed by Robert
Moses in New York, that cross over parkways leading to certain beaches on Long Island.
That these overpasses were designed low enough so as to prevent busses, and hence the
social classes that depend on them, from reaching the beach is taken as an explicitly
political act. Not only do the overpasses enact a particular political vision, but they also
remain a difficult-to-change, obdurate component of New York’s transportation
infrastructure.
While Winner’s take on Moses has been contested over the decades since it was
first published, it nevertheless illustrates the work enacted through obdurate objects and
their effects upon the world. Concerning the “how” of obduracy, Anique Hommels
(2005) describes a debate between theorists of obduracy on whether it (obduracy)
emerges as it is “deliberately built into artifacts” (336) or is the result of an artifact’s
embeddedness in a network or system. For the purposes of this analysis, I focus on the
latter supposition, the ways in which systemic entanglements and interactions contribute
to the immovability of other system components. Following this, dams resist removal in
part due to their materiality, but also because of the vast enviro-technical systems in
which they come to occupy pivotal (and sometimes unplanned) roles.
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The work of obdurate objects speaks to a second, related idea from STS, namely the
concept of techno-politics. Although often associated with the work of Timothy Mitchell
(2002), techno-politics, as an analytical and theoretical approach, has been indelibly
shaped by the work of Gabrielle Hecht who describes the concept (techno-politics) as
“[T]he strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact
political goals” (2001, 256). For the purposes of my analysis, and indeed anywhere
human motives are obscured or difficult to discern, I argue that the strategic element need
not be apparent, nor an object of concern. Mitchell’s work, while invoking a similar
interest in the political outcomes of purportedly value-neutral work, tends to dwell more
on practice and techniques, as opposed to the more material conception offered by Hecht.
Considering dams and dam removal, the present value of the concept is then in its ability
to innately connect politics to material, nonhuman things (as artifacts of technology).
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Methods
This study used a mixed, qualitative methodological approach to examine the
work of politics in and through the removal of the San Clemente Dam. In particular, I
employed semi-structured interviews, discourse analysis, as well as archival research and
document analysis. In what follows, I describe the initial research design and subsequent
adjustments, which coalesced in the final design, study, and analysis. While the
methodological approach of my study was updated from the original proposed design, the
central, guiding research questions (as described above) remain consistent.
The initial design of this study included a focus on discourse analysis, to be
performed on the results of semi-structured interviews as well as archival documents
related to the removal project. Specifically, I was interested in examining the
“technological frames” (see Bijker 1997) of various actors, and subsequently, intended to
employ discourse analysis to understand the logic and narratives inherent to distinct
frames. These concerns and interests are represented in the secondary research questions
of this study: how are politics represented in the discourses surrounding the removal of
the San Clemente Dam? And how did these political discourses shape or enable the dam
removal project?
While the concept of the technological frame offers some methodological and
analytical utility, it became quickly apparent, upon commencing the actual research
process, that the goal of identifying, analyzing, and explaining the existence of multiple,
hypothetically discrete technological frames would overwhelm any available resources of
time and attention, and necessitate a deep, comprehensive understanding of the removal,
its lead-up and the enviro-technical system within which it occurred. This realization
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represents a key flaw in the research design, specifically that the number of interviews
and time allotted to complete the project would not allow for a rigorous understanding of
the particular perspectives taken by various parties on what often proved to be highly
technical matters. In light of these realizations, the study design was then altered so that
the technological frame was no longer a critical object of analysis.
In conjuncture with an attention to discourse analysis and the aforementioned
research questions, the initial research design also centered on understanding the ways or
means by which politics are embedded in the post-removal landscape. This concern
compelled me to look at different parties and stakeholders, and to work towards
identifying how the post-removal landscape was shaped by negotiations, management of
power, politics, and the power-laden ends to which it contributes. Overall, the secondary
research question directed towards these issues (what are the politics embedded in the
post-removal landscape?) necessitated a similarly robust understanding of local politics
represented (as above) in theoretical terms by the enviro-technical system, as outlined in
my literature review.
Although discourse analysis nevertheless plays a role in the analysis and
conclusions of this study, the work of documenting and explaining the functional role of
politics throughout the project took an outsized role. This shift in focus (in more detail
below) occurred in response to my realizations of the limits and study and
presuppositions built into the research design, as well as compelling direction taken from
the data itself.
In order to analyze discourses and gain a more robust knowledge of the removal
project, the initial study design called for the collection of relevant documents, reports,
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and publications related to the removal. These collected documents were to have included
those from before, during, and after the removal process. Although the post-removal
period is likely a significant timespan for understanding the ramifications of the project,
the abundance and richness of available information, in concert with the complexity of
the project, prompted my decision to focus exclusively on documents produced in the
time periods preceding and concurrent with removal. My general understanding of the
San Clemente Dam Removal was bolstered and strengthened by studying dozens of
historical reports, letters, meeting minutes, and similar documents. All told, I collected
and consulted approximately 50 documents. Among these, I cite several (including
environmental impact reports) in this study. The original study design called for the
consideration of a wide range of documents produced by parties affected by or involved
with the removal. In practice, the majority of relevant documents, and those of the most
apparent analytic utility, consisted of government reports and memorandums.
Following the collection of documents, my initial study design called for the
development of a coding scheme in order analyze and code the information contained in
the relevant documents. This process was intended to contribute to the identification and
analysis of latent content in the form of discourses and narratives. Adapting to time
constraints and the merging complexity of the removal story, the documents were instead
used in constructing a history of events, contributing to an understanding and
illumination of relevant interactions between actors and stakeholders.
The analysis this process lends itself towards is, admittedly, less attentive to the
inter-relationships and co-production of knowledge and power (typical objects of
attention in discourse analysis). Rather, it takes a more functional perspective on power
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and politics, relying on a less problematized version of events and portrayal of removal
proceedings. The analytical benefit of this is adjustment is, I maintain, an overall more
robust understanding of the events, actors, and processes that comprise the envirotechnical system and regime.
My initial proposal called for interviews with six to ten participants. I drafted a
list of questions and follow-up questions to guide the interview. Each question was
intended to elucidate or encourage information on a specific primary or secondary
research question. In the initial design, research subjects were to have been selected as
they corresponded to three general groups; private interests, public interests, and
oppositional interests (those who opposed the project). The subjects were to have been
located and identified using a snowball sample technique, where existing contacts
recommended or indicate additional subjects (Hay 2005, 72).
During the fieldwork process I completed seven semi-structured interviews, using
the interview guide (see Appendix). Each interview lasted approximately one hour, with
several ending after close to two hours. I also made a number of personal
communications (unrecorded) with acquaintances familiar with the San Clemente project.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed to facilitate analysis. The subjects I spoke
with included individuals such as a community member with a deep knowledge of
pertinent issues; the representative of a local non-governmental organization connected to
the Carmel River and the San Clemente Dam; representatives from local, state, and
federal agencies (all of whom collaborated on the project); and a fisheries biologist who
worked on this and similar projects. In order to protect anonymity, personal details of the
interview subjects have largely been omitted from my writing. In the pursuit of a
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representative sample, I also requested an interview with a representative of the dam
owner (California American Water), but my request was respectfully denied. This
resulted in a key, missing voice in the final analysis.
While my initial plan for categorizing interview subjects (public, private, and
oppositional interests) was somewhat useful for identifying stakeholders, the task of
categorizing interview subjects grew in complexity as details of the project emerged. For
instance, several subjects had overlapping connections to the project (as government
employees and local residents). Similarly, there was little direct, vocal opposition to the
removal of the dam itself (although some locals temporarily voiced frustration at truck
traffic during the removal process). Moreover, alliances or connections between
stakeholder groups shifted throughout the removal process. This was most clearly
demonstrated through the project team, composed of California American Water (Cal
Am), the California State Coastal Conservancy, and National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS). Whereas Cal Am and NMFS were formerly of an adversarial relationship
regarding the dam and impacts of impoundments to anadromous fish, the two
stakeholders later collaborated on the removal as part of the project team. Indeed, the
project team, as a public-private partnership (blurring the lines between my public and
private interest categories), often experienced its most significant resistance from other
government agencies (public interests).
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Table 1
Interview Subjects
Role

Number of Subjects

Government employee

4

Local resident

1

Non-governmental agency representative

1

Employee of private firm involved with removal

1

As with the document analysis, my focus in the analysis of these interviews
shifted to their utility in documenting and explaining the actions and motivations of
various actors. Information and quotes gathered from the transcripts add depth and
elucidate positions and positionality not necessarily visible in available descriptions of
the project, or in the government documents I collected. So, while discourse analysis
remained a component of my interview-analysis process, the main contribution of these
transcripts was in documenting the “what” of political machinations, rather than the
“how” which might be explained through a more in-depth focus on discourse and
narrative. The experiences and perspectives related by my interview subjects proved
invaluable in understanding and shaping explanation of my investigations into the agency
of various components of the enviro-technical system.
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Figure 1. Adapted map of the region and project area (California Department of Water
Resources 2012).
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History and Analysis
Case Study
The primary case study for this analysis is the removal of the San Clemente Dam
near Monterey, California. The dam, which stood 106 feet tall and (at least initially)
impounded some 1,500 acre feet of water on the Carmel River, was the largest such
structure ever removed in the state of California. Although the removal project, officially
dubbed the Carmel River Reroute and Dam Removal, compared in cost and magnitude to
other recent removals of high dams, the media attention it received was relatively
minimal. This lack of attention is perhaps not all that unusual, but given the magnitude of
the project, the novelty of the engineering involved, and the complex character of the
region and landscape from which the dam was removed, the story makes a compelling
site to examine these issues.
Flowing some 36 miles, the Carmel River originates in the Santa Lucia Mountains
of the California Coastal Range and empties into the Pacific Ocean in Carmel Bay, at the
southern end of the Monterey Peninsula. For over two centuries, and perhaps a great
while longer than that, the river has been the primary water source for communities on
the peninsula and has supported the growth of its industries over time. Although a
number of small dams and diversions have been built on the river, the dominant
structures were the San Clemente Dam (now gone) and the Los Padres Dam (still there,
farther upstream). Both dams were constructed to provide water to support population
growth, tourism, and the sardine industry, made famous in John Steinbeck’s Cannery
Row (1945/1994). The municipal water supply of the Monterey Peninsula, including the
communities of Carmel and Monterey, is currently provided by California American
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Water Company (Cal Am), an investor-owned utility and a subsidiary of American
Water. Cal Am purchased most of its Monterey Peninsula water rights and infrastructure,
including the San Clemente Dam, from another private utility in 1966.
In what follows, I describe and explicate the enviro-technical system into which the
San Clemente Dam was built, and into which it became an integral, physical component.
By the time the dam was a candidate for removal, it had become thoroughly enmeshed in
a complex, porous system and presented distinct challenges for advocates of removal.
During the period from 1980 until 2015, throughout which time a dynamic coalition
advocated for and executed the dam’s removal (overcoming its pronounced obduracy),
political and social interests indelibly shaped the removal process and the eventual
physical outcome.
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Figure 2. Photograph of the San Clemente Dam prior to removal (California American
Water n.d.).
Outlining the System
For 94 years, the San Clemente Dam obstructed the Carmel River, its concrete
arch impounding a large, once-deep reservoir and, over time, accumulating a startling
mass of sediment. During those decades, its presence indelibly shaped the greater region
it was built to serve—materially, politically, and ecologically. In its service life and
beyond, the dam comprised a sometimes-integral position with a historically contingent
system of environmental, technical, social and political components.
While the removal of the dam (from the landscape and the system) is at the heart
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of this study, the politics of removal, and the means by which the practice of dam
removal came to this particular location, are both historically situated. In the following
subsection, I trace the pre-existing political context and enviro-technical system within
which the removal came to be.
This is not a complete history of the San Clemente dam or the region, but a
presentation of particular vignettes or episodes that serve to illustrate changes to or
alterations in the system. As an analytic framework, the enviro-technical system helps to
focus the analysis on relevant factors of phenomena, but even within the system there
must be elements which remain beyond analysis. The story that emerges is intended less
to fully capture the enviro-technical system surrounding the San Clemente Dam, but
rather to reflect and highlight the elements of it that proved most pertinent and telling
within the context of the dam’s removal.
The enviro-technical system within which the removal occurred is composed of a
multitude of distinct actors. Broadly speaking, agencies, interest groups, the local
municipal water system, and private individuals connected to the Carmel River are linked
within the system. Key players in the contemporary system include the Monterey
Peninsula Water Management District (MPWMD), the dam owner (California American
Water), and government agencies with mandates connected to the river and surrounding
area including the California State Coastal Conservancy (SCC), the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), and Monterey County Planning Department.
As the removal project progressed, actors from a wider geographic sphere, most
pertinently NMFS and SCC, became integral to the composition of the system and
changes therein. Throughout the removal process, the specific, spatial boundaries of the
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enviro-technical system retained relative clarity. Generally speaking the removal
involved or affected three distinct, overlapping geographic areas.
First, the removal concerned the Carmel River ecosystem and riparian corridor. In
general, dam removal has distinct up- and downstream ramifications, primarily
characterized by altered or adjusted flow regimes (Stanley and Doyle 2003), channel
morphology (Doyle et al. 2003), sediment transport (Pizzuto 2002), riparian vegetation
(Shafroth et al. 2002), and biotic connectivity (Magilligan et al. 2016). Given this
multiplicity of effects, the entire river corridor is subject, in varying measure, to changes
subsequent to dam removal.
The region and municipalities that rely on the river and water it transports for
environmental services define a second geographic scale for the enviro-technical system.
Relevant ecological services here include habitat for anadromous fish species
(particularly steelhead trout), recreational interests in the surrounding environment, and
most pertinently, provision of drinking water to the Monterey Peninsula. The Carmel
River is the primary municipal water source for a distinct geographic region in the area,
which comprises a key geographic boundary for the analysis in this study.
Finally, the removal directly involves areas immediately proximal to the dam site.
Although they are situated outside of the river corridor and are not connected to the
river’s municipal-water-provision function, small communities (namely Sleepy Hollow
and Cachagua) located near or en route to the dam site were directly affected by its
removal, owing to the construction projects involved with removing the dam and
rerouting the river.
The Monterey Peninsula sits approximately 100 miles south of San Francisco,
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along California’s central coast. Population estimates vary, depending on how one
defines the “peninsula,” and which portions of its principle communities of Monterey,
Carmel-by-the-Sea, Seaside, and Pacific Grove are included in the estimates. The
Monterey Peninsula Water Management District, which oversees the allocation and
management of water resources for much of the region, counts approximately 100,000
individuals as its direct constituents, and although this figure does not entirely reflect the
regional population, it is a useful representation of population tied into the region’s
waterscape (Monterey Peninsula Water Management District n.d.).
Much of the literature on water and water systems in California has focused on
the large, interconnected networks that span the state (see Hundley 1992, Worster 1985)
and draw from watersheds originating as far away as Wyoming (Reisner 1993). In
contrast, the Monterey Peninsula is for most purposes effectively isolated, remaining
unconnected to the broader technical infrastructure systems in the region and state. The
Carmel River is the region’s primary water source—approximately seventy percent of the
its municipal water supply comes from the California American Water Company’s wells
on the lower river, with the remaining thirty percent coming from the upstream Los
Padres Reservoir, diversion at San Clemente reservoir (recently eliminated), and the
Seaside Basin (California American Water 2009). The region’s high degree of
dependence on a single stream is notable in California, particularly given the complex,
interconnected infrastructure that serves many other regions within the state. There are
analogous configurations within the state (see for instance, the Sonoma County Water
Agency’s dependence on the Russian River and Eel River watersheds), but peninsula’s
reliance on a single water source, coupled with its relatively high level of development
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and proximity to agricultural, appears generally singular.
The Monterey Peninsula Water Management District, which oversees local water
resources in the region represents California’s legacy of local, decentralized government
managerial bodies which began with the passage of the 1887 Wright Act (Hundley 1992).
The Wright Act authorized the implementation of local irrigation districts, creating a
model that was followed by a number of local government districts in the state, some of
which, like the MPWMD, explicitly managed municipal water supplies. Following
significant drought and water shortages, the Monterey Peninsula Water Management
District was assembled in 1978 as a direct response to fish die-offs (particularly
steelhead) and the general degradation of the Carmel River watershed due to California
American Water Company’s pumping of water from the river to fulfill its municipal
needs (March 2012, 101). The district was formed largely to provide oversight regarding
water allocation in the region and to prevent further water shortages like those
experienced in 1978, wherein the appropriative rights (see Hundley 1992, Worster 1985)
of the water company conflicted with both public goods (the river ecosystem) and the
riparian rights held by landowners along the river.
The formation of the MPWMD, and the conflicts it dealt with, were an outgrowth
of the legacy of water development in the region. The Carmel River had served its
function of water provision since the first European settlements were established in the
area, and realistically much longer, given indigenous settlements in the region. But the
modern historical legacy surrounding the river is marked by the touristic and real estate
development that began in the region towards the end of the 19th century. This history
traces a development strategy that shaped the region and tied local municipalities to the
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Carmel River.
In 1880, the Pacific Improvement Company began work on its soon-to-be-wellknown Hotel Del Monte—a project demonstrating the new regional development strategy
that used tourism to drive residential growth (March 2012, Chiang 2009). The Del Monte
project necessitated the building of the first dam on the Carmel River, the “Old Carmel
Dam,” and laid the foundations, in some cases literally, for the region’s water
infrastructure (Chiang 2009 26). In addition to supplying water to Hotel Del Monte, the
Pacific Improvement Company used their Carmel River diversions to supply water to
new housing developments in the late 1800s and early 20th century. In 1905, the Pacific
Improvement Company created the Monterey County Water Works (MCWW) as a
subsidiary company in possession of the parent company’s various water works and
infrastructure.
Continuing this legacy of private service provision, the Pacific Improvement
company sold MCWW to the Del Monte Properties Company in 1919 (March 2012, JRP
Historical Consulting 2014). Immediately thereafter, in order to further regional
development and home sales, MCWW began their pursuit of a larger dam on the Carmel
River. Construction was completed on the 106-foot San Clemente dam in 1921 which,
until the larger Los Padres Dam was constructed upstream in 1949, served as the
infrastructural centerpiece for local water provision in the region (March 2012, JRP
Historical Consulting 2014). MCWW’s water infrastructure, including the San Clemente
dam, changed hands in 1935 and again in 1966, when the dam was purchased by
California American Water Works (Cal Am), a newly minted division of American
Water Works.
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Table 2
San Clemente Dam Timeline
Year

Event

1880

Hotel Del Monte construction

1921

San Clemente Dam completed

1966

California American Water purchases San Clemente Dam (and other assets)

1972

Dormandy Airstrip

1977

Marble Cone Fire

1982

First surveys completed for DSOD

1992

WCC report finds structural liabilities

1997

Steelhead listed as threatened species

1999

Kirk Complex fire

2006

Recirculated Draft EIR includes reroute and removal option

2007

State Coastal Conservancy involvement

2010

Collaboration statement signed between parties and project team

2012

CPUC approves reroute and removal project

2013

Removal construction begins

2015

Removal complete

Dams naturally accumulate sediment, which would otherwise pass downstream
unobstructed. Over its service life, the San Clemente Dam was subject to this geomorphic
process. Additionally, the regular sediment accumulation of the San Clemente Dam was
amplified by a number of critical events that caused the deposit of significant amounts of
sediment. The Marble Cone Fire (1977) and the Kirk Complex Fire (1999) have both
been pointed to as events that caused significant amounts of sediment to be swept into the
river. Similarly, in 1972, a private individual constructed the Dormandy Airstrip on their
property, which led to landslides that caused a significant volume of sediment to wash
into the river and accumulate behind the San Clemente Dam (California Public Utilities
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Commission 2012). This accumulation of sediment would eventually become a key factor
in the dam’s fate.

Lead-up to Removal
By 1980, the San Clemente Dam was an artifact of declining utility, although the
dam and impoundment would continue as an active component in water provision for
another 22 years. Sedimentation and the rapid infilling of the reservoir had become
obvious decades before (Monterey Peninsula Water Management District 1989), and the
significant increases in sediment resulting from the Marble Cone Fire and the Dormandy
Airstrip had demonstrated the material consequences of individual events on the
functionality of the dam. By 2015 (California Department of Water Resources 2012), the
reservoir that once boasted a storage capacity some 1500 acre-feet of water, was only
capable of impounding five percent of its original volume. And yet, in spite of the dam’s
clear and impending uselessness due to its manifold sedimentation issues, it was
ultimately the threat of earthquakes and floods that first precipitated a consideration of
what was to be done with the San Clemente Dam.
When construction of the San Clemente Dam began in 1919, the owner/operator
(then the Pacific Improvement Company) was minimally regulated with regard to
permitting or formal governance. During its service life, the dam and its operators
became subject to modern oversight, and decisions about the dam that became the
purview of government authorities at multiple scales that were not necessarily present in
the original enviro-technical system. Ultimately, the removal was fundamentally shaped
by three key agencies, which often exhibited overlapping, contrary mandates—the
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California Department of Water Resources Division of Dam Safety, the California Public
Utilities Commission Division of Ratepayer Advocates, and the National Marine
Fisheries Service. In addition to those three organizations, the California Department of
Fish and Wildlife (formerly Fish and Game), The Monterey Peninsula Water
Management District, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the US Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Monterey County Planning Commission also exercised jurisdictional
responsibility and shaped the dam removal process.
The first actions leading towards the removal of the San Clemente Dam began in
1980, when the California Department of Water Resources Division of Safety of Damns
(DOSD) ordered California American Water to conduct surveys regarding the dam’s
capacity to pass and withstand a Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) or Maximum Credible
Earthquake (MCE) (California Public Utilities Commission 2012). Cal Am hired a
contractor to complete the required analysis, which was first submitted to the DOSD in
1982 and indicated the dam’s structural soundness in either event. Over the next six
years, the DOSD continued to request additional analyses. During this same period, the
Monterey Peninsula Water Management District pursued the construction of a new,
larger dam on the river (the “New San Clemente Project”), which would inundate the
original San Clemente Dam. The DOSD agreed to defer their requests for further analysis
on the San Clemente (California Department of Water Resources 2012) while the new
construction project was being explored.
Bowing in part to the public’s concerns over negative environmental outcomes,
the MPWMD canceled plans for the New San Clemente Project in 1989. With the San
Clemente Dam no longer facing inundation, the DOSD requested an updated analysis of
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the structure with respect to MCE and PMF, resulting in the 1992 report “The Seismic
and Flood Stability Evaluation, San Clemente Dam” (Woodward-Clyde Consultants
1992). This report demonstrated significant structural liabilities and prompted the DOSD
to require that Cal Am bring the dam into compliance with current safety standards
(California Department of Water Resources & US Army Corps of Engineers 2012).
Significantly, the report found that the dam was likely to collapse in the event of a 7.0
earthquake on the nearby Tularcitos Fault (CDWR & USACE 2008) and be overtopped
by 14 feet of water in the event of the maximum probable flood. Either event would pose
significant risk to the area’s residents and 1500+ homes located downstream of the dam
(California Department of Water Resources 2012).
Multiple subjects interviewed in the course of this study indicated that throughout
the early 1990s, both Cal Am and the DOSD were in favor of non-removal options, as
evidenced by multiple reports produced during that time. Indeed, the 1998 first Draft EIR
prepared by the DOSD did not include dam removal as one of the proposed options (see
California Public Utilities Commission 2012). DOSD released three subsequent draft
environmental impact reports that also did not consider removal. While Cal Am
continued to advocate for reinforcing or “buttressing” the dam, NMFS began (according
to interview subjects) to apply pressure to consider removal as an option.
During this time period, two species in the Carmel River ecosystem were listed as
threatened under the Endangered Species Act: the California Red-Legged Frog in 1996
and the South-Central California Coast Steelhead Evolutionarily Significant Unit in 1997.
Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, NMFS is charged with assessing the
potential impacts resulting from projects undertaken or permitted by other federal
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agencies with regard to threatened marine species. In this instance, Cal Am was required
to obtain a Section 404 Permit, under the Clean Water Act, from the US Army Corps of
Engineers. Interview subjects reported that, in advocating for the inclusion of removal as
a viable option for the San Clemente Dam, NMFS threatened to issue a jeopardy opinion
on the impacts of buttressing—indicating that the project would have a profound,
negative impact on local steelhead and halting any progress on addressing the dam.
During interviews, one NMFS official shared that “you know, the run probably would
have been wiped out if [the dam] had stayed in, so it just seemed like a no-brainer.”
Addressing concerns and issues in the original Draft EIR, the DOSD issued a
second EIR in 2000 (the Recirculated Draft EIR or RDEIR), but following further
criticism in the form of public and agency comments, the DOSD withdrew this RDEIR in
2002 (California Public Utilities Commission 2012). Bowing to pressure from NMFS
(among others advocating for removal), the DOSD began a combined EIR/EIS process
with USACE and, for the first time, included dam removal during the “scoping process’.
In 2006, the DOSD complete The San Clemente Dam Seismic Safety Project Draft
EIR/EIS, which include the Carmel River Reroute and Dam Removal as an option for
addressing the seismic and flood risks of the dam.
After the latest EIR/EIS was released, the California State Coastal Conservancy
began to directly involve themselves in the San Clemente project. Mandated with
providing technical and financial assistance to projects intended to enhance or protect
California’s coastline, and having previously funded studies on dam removal, the
conservancy began to work on San Clemente project as an advocate for removal, and in
2007, funded $700,000 worth of studies to evaluate the removal option (California Public
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Utilities Commission 2012).
One interview subject, a government official deeply involved with this stage of
the process and an advocate for the removal and reroute option, shared that, although the
reroute option had been included in the 2006 Draft EIR/EIS, it still had less-thanuniversal support, from Cal Am and, more pertinently, the firm hired to work on the EIR.
They stated that:
The consultants that did the engineering for the EIR, they were pretty firm on the
project is going to be dam-strengthening. But they were the ones that had done the
preliminary design for the reroute project…
The firm referenced above was later hired to write a basis of design report, which would
further explain and expand on the engineering information contained in the original EIR.
The interview subject quoted above explained that this basis-of-design report (MWH
Americas 2008) illuminated a continued recalcitrance towards removal that was
indicative of a preference for buttressing.
And it was kind of in that process that I really learned how reluctant they were, I
mean, they just they just didn't take the dam removal seriously. A lot of people
didn't for a while.
Several additional interview subjects described an ensuing period of intense
negotiations, challenges, and bureaucratic machinations that unfolded in light of this
resistance towards removal. A number of design, restoration, and engineering firms were
consulted at different stages of the process because of their expertise in dam removal, but
also, reportedly, because of their propensity towards it. As reported by several interview
subjects, the efforts towards removal, directly countered pressure from the DOSD to
finish the project via buttressing, and therefore mitigate the risks of dam failure, as
quickly as possible.
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During this same time frame, the SCC and NMFS were reportedly collaborating on
means to secure funding for the reroute and removal project. Although some of the
particulars of funding are discussed in subsequent sections, it is relevant to point out that
the final organization of funding and funding sources was partly the result of calculated
decisions by proponents of removal—namely, the SCC and NMFS. These organizations
were committed to funding any costs of removal that exceeded the $49,000,000
buttressing effort estimate made by Cal Am.
With the removal and reroute option included in the 2008 Final EIR/EIS (CDWR &
USACE 2008) and a portion of the funding puzzle completed and on the table, 12
organizations signed an agreement indicating support and collaboration on the removal
and reroute option (California American Water 2010). The planned reroute accomplished
three, related goals: it mitigated the risks associated with dam failure; it provided a
purportedly advantageous alternative for endangered species and enhanced watershed
connectivity (critical for anadromous steelhead); and it provided a socially, fiscally, and
politically viable solution for the 2.5 million cubic yards of sediment which had
accumulated behind the dam.
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Figure 3. Adapted reroute project map (California American Water n.d.).

44

Figure 4. Aerial photo of project site showing reservoir and sediment accumulation
(California State Coastal Conservancy n.d.).
Funding
In the course of my interviews, I asked participants to talk about how the removal
was funded. Responses ranged from detailed discussions of the mechanisms by which
funding was secured to broader, speculative commentary on responsibility and who,
ultimately, should pay for such projects. Some interview subjects, particularly those
associated with the removal project team, pointed to the orchestration and management of
funding issues as a key success in the project, indicating that there were significant
hurdles in finding and raising sufficient funds, as well as in assuaging concerns and
addressing mandates of particular agencies. Others expressed a pronounced, dim view of
the funding outcomes (who eventually paid for the removal), generally linking these
concerns to larger issues around local water, utilities, and ongoing political conflict.
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One subject, a government engineer involved with the project nearly from the
beginning, pointed out an issue at the heart of removal—that in general, dams are built
without a plan for the end of their service life—an issue that encompasses the particulars
of the San Clemente case. Like other artifacts of infrastructure, dams project into the
future not only their inherent purpose or politics, but a looming burden, in this case
financial, and unanswered questions regarding how to deal with them when the envirotechnical system within which they once functioned has changed or been changed to the
point that the artifact no longer functions. As this subject posited:
I mean there should be a mechanism to fund decommissioning or to fund some
kind of maintenance for the facility. Otherwise you're allowing the people today
to benefit from that facility and the people tomorrow have to pay for the cost of
dealing with it which isn't fair. It's saddling future generations with the cost of the
what the older generation got a benefit from. So, there's some unfair practices in
my opinion going on as far as funding the maintenance and eventual
decommissioning.
The issues the engineer is explaining—that the ostensible lack of a funding mechanism in
a well-regulated utility and governmental context has certain consequences—composed
some of the more significant challenges the project team (Cal Am, SCC, and NMFS)
faced in working towards the removal and reroute.
In more general terms, the myriad of financial and funding-related questions
speaks to the challenges of adapting or translating the technology of dam removal to the
San Clemente context, with its attendant enviro-technical system and regime. While the
biogeophysical realities of the river corridor, ecosystem, and landscape shaped the
material design of the removal and reroute, so too did the human, political, and
governmental dimensions determine the particularities of how removal technology was
translated to the San Clemente Dam site.
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Another perspective on removal funding and financing issues calls for
consideration of the ways in which funding represents a component of the dam’s
obduracy. While the dam’s physical mass contributed to the challenge of pulling it down,
both with respect to work expended to remove it, as well as the financial costs of any
alteration to the structure, so too did the dam’s situatedness within a complex system of
governance and a historically contingent enviro-technical system. The dam’s active
entanglement in a political network contributed to what Jane Bennet has referred to as the
“negative power or recalcitrance of material things” (2009, 1).
In the end, the total cost of the removal and reroute project amounted to
$83,133,000, with Cal Am bearing $49,000,000 (California American Water n.d.). The
rest of the costs of funding the removal are broken down in Table 3, below:

Table 3
Project Costs and Funding
Organization
Type of Organization

Contribution

Percent of Total

Private Corporation

$49,000,000

58.94

State of California

Government

$28,200,000

33.92

Federal Government

Government

$2,500,000

3.01

Private Corporation (Cal Am)

$2,000,000

2.41

The Nature Conservancy

Non-Governmental

$1,000,000

1.2

Resources Legacy Fund

Non-Governmental

$433,000

.52

Cal Am

Settlement Funds

California American Water n.d.

Contributions from two non-governmental organizations, the Nature Conservancy
and Resources Legacy Fund represent overlap between these organizations’ missions and
the ecological benefits of dam removal. The $2,000,000 in settlement funds came from
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Cal Am (separate from their $49,000,000 project costs), as a result of lawsuits over Cal
Am’s detrimental pumping, diversions, and dewatering of the Carmel River. This
settlement mandated that $3,500,000 was allocated immediately for projects benefitting
steelhead, with an additional $1,100,000 paid annually (California American Water and
National Marine Fisheries Service 2006).
Although the settlement funds comprised a small portion of the project’s overall
funding, they nevertheless illustrate the means by which legacies of resource use,
conservation, and conflicts over water shaped and influenced the removal of the San
Clemente Dam. The settlement funds demonstrate how particular ecosystem services or
functions, in this case water for anadromous fish, influence, guide, and make possible
larger projects, including environmental restoration and dam removal. Issues of low to
marginal summer flows in the Carmel River were certainly not the only environmental
threat facing steelhead (spawning gravel, habitat connectivity, and non-native striped bass
are all reported, local concerns), nor were steelhead the only sensitive or threatened
species adversely affected by Cal Am’s assets on the river. One interview subject, a local
recreational angler, pointed out that Pacific lamprey (Entosphenus tridentatus) also faced
distinct threats in the river but received comparatively less attention.
The State of California, represented by SCC, contributed the second largest share
of funding ($28,200,000) to the removal project. During interviews, one subject who
worked closely with the State described a process of “enticement,” wherein a
demonstration of funds available to cover the cost of removal was used to keep Cal Am
interested in the project. Cal Am apparently showed tentative support for the removal and
reroute until 2009 when the State entered a financial crisis and most of the State’s funds
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were temporarily frozen. At this time, Cal Am reportedly withdrew from negotiations,
effectively halting progress on the removal and reroute.
Cal Am eventually rejoined negotiations, a juncture which several interview
subjects indicated was a significant moment in the lead-up to removal. Furthermore, all
interviewees who had been involved with planning and orchestrating the removal drew
attention to the important role of Cal Am president Rob McLean, who took on that
position in 2009, following Cal Am’s withdrawal from negotiations under the previous
company president. As incoming president, McClean reportedly had little knowledge of
the issues surrounding the San Clemente Dam and, according to interview subjects, was
summoned to the office of local US Congressional Representative Sam Farr. One
interview subject, a key member of the project team and government employee, described
that period and Farr’s intervention.
But Cal Am got a new president and honestly that made the biggest difference. He
came and in one of his first months in office. He went to DC and met with
Congressman Sam Farr and Sam Farr, who has always loved this project, just read
him the riot act; ‘why did you guys pull out and backing this project?’
During that conversation, Congressman Farr reportedly informed McClean of the
importance of the dam removal and pressured Cal Am to rejoin negotiations.
Subsequently, Cal Am, along with 11 other stakeholders signed a memorandum of
agreement, indicating support for the project (California American Water 2010).
The micro-politics behind the removal team and project itself facilitated the actual
funding and completion of the San Clemente Dam Removal. As indicated in Table 3, Cal
Am contributed $49,000,000 to the removal and reroute, an amount equivalent to and
determined by the estimated cost of buttressing the dam and keeping it in place, which
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was the least-cost alternative for addressing risks associated with the aging structure. The
least-cost alternative was both advantageous to Cal Am (as a for-profit corporation) and
also a mandate, given state regulations pertaining to investor-owned utilities.
The majority of water utilities in the United States are publicly owned and
managed (Food and Water Watch 2016). In contrast, municipal water on the Monterey
Peninsula is supplied by Cal Am (privately owned). This arrangement is part of the
historical legacy of infrastructural development and investment on the Monterey
Peninsula in the early twentieth century by private enterprises, as well as agreements
involving water provision and infrastructure (March 2012). Since Cal Am purchased
assets on the Monterey Peninsula in 1966, the local historic records show several
instances of dissatisfaction regarding the private utility on the part of locals (March
2012). Most recently, this was exemplified by a successful ballot measure and the Public
Water Now campaign, which authorized and directed the Monterey Peninsula Water
Management to study a public buyout of the peninsula’s water system, implying that
steps might be taken towards de-privatization. One interview subject, a lifelong resident
of the peninsula and political activist, connected frustrations concerning Cal Am’s legacy
to a perceived exploitation of ratepayers by Cal Am, with regard to their contributions
towards the removal. The subject felt that Cal Am’s shareholders, and not ratepayers,
should have born the cost of removal.
California investor-owned utilities are regulated by the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC), with decisions regarding cost recovery subject to oversight by the
Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA). These regulatory structures allow the utility
(Cal Am) to recover costs associated with the company’s “used and useful” assets, in this
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case the dam, through rate increases. However, the utility is required by the DRA to purse
the “least-cost alternative.” Interview subjects who worked with the removal project team
uniformly reported that receiving approval for the removal from the DRA was a
significant hurdle because the DRA was pushing Cal Am to pursue buttressing, the
“least-cost alternative”, over removal. Eventually, with robust cooperation between
NMFS, Cal Am, and the SCC, the DRA issued approval for Cal Am to use a rate increase
to recoup the costs equivalent to buttressing (California Public Utilities Commission
2012). One interview subject, a senior government official who worked on the removal
project in a critical capacity, summarized the relationship between Cal Am, the DRA, and
costs associated with the project:
Everybody pretty much agreed, with the exception of Cal Am, that the San
Clemente Dam should come out, and the reason Cal Am wanted to stay in was
because they said they maintained that it was the cheapest alternative and that the
CPUC, the California Public Utilities Commission, says you need to go with a
cheapest alternative. So that was their mantra. But when they understood that the
difference in costs would be paid for by others, they were much more willing to
go along with ‘OK, Let's look at other alternatives to buttressing’.
This significant hurdle further demonstrates the obduracy of the structure. Historic
legacies around utilities and infrastructural development on the peninsula helped
engender a complex system, within which state agencies, in this case the SCC and DRA,
worked to enact counterposed agendas. Resolving and overcoming these entanglements
was necessary before the material work of dam removal could proceed. Even this
relatively bureaucratic process was imbued with political currents and ramifications,
especially in the arrangement of a public-private partnership, wherein taxpayers funded
the ecologically preferred alternative to dam buttressing and the utility was allowed to
divert costs associated with the asset to ratepayers.
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A final point of contention, although one which received little fanfare, came in the
form of Cal Am’s cost recovery of an additional $26,000,000 that they spent studying and
working towards dam buttressing (California Public Utilities Commission 2012). With
some resistance, the DRA approved rate increases to cover these costs, despite the fact
that the spending did not contribute to the finalized form of the project (California Public
Utilities Commission 2012). At least one advocacy group (the Public Water Now
campaign) voiced frustration with these rate increases, calling them another benefit
accrued by the utility at its ratepayer’s expense.
The configuration of funding related to the San Clemente Dam Removal comprise
an explicitly political outcome. Although they serve a broad constituency, privately
owned structures like the San Clemente Dam also generate profits for shareholders and
corporations. Yet without a clear plan for their end-of-service-life, the costs, at least in
this instance, fall to the public. The state and federal government, in conjunction with
local ratepayers, effectively financed the bulk of the San Clemente Dam Removal project.
This points to the role politics play in shaping the enviro-technical system and, as a
result, overcoming the obduracy of the San Clemente Dam. Despite the fact that the dam
itself was reported to have been built with a predicted working lifespan of only 30 years
(March 2012), and that Cal Am purchased the structure in full knowledge of its declining
utility, it fell to the public to fund the removal. Furthermore, the mechanism by which
that funding was acquired, the public-private partnership, is a financial program with its
own particular history and politics (see Linder 1999).
Regarding the allocation of costs and benefits pertaining to dam removal, a
biologist employed by one of the private firms involved in the project articulated a
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slightly more generous view of the costs of removals.
[A] dam operator, if they've got this huge sort of public liability and then here's an
environmental… here's an environmental public concern that can write checks to
take it out. Of course, yeah it's a win-win situation for them. ‘Here we get to look
like really good guys’. And you know on the environmental sides it's a good deal
because, hey, we're getting… we're getting environmental benefit. There's no
doubt there's environmental benefit.
In the San Clemente case, however, that environmental benefit also served social needs.
Throughout the planning phases of the project, significant attention was given not only to
environmental impacts, but to the ways in which the changes to the river’s sediment
regime resulting from the removal and reroute might affect downstream properties and
homeowners. In the following section, I describe and asses the effects of the perceived
liabilities having to do with downstream consequences, and how they fundamentally
shaped the removal process.
Post-Removal Landscape
Following the completion of the San Clemente Dam Removal in 2015, the Carmel
River now flows for half a mile through the bed of what was formerly San Clemente
Creek. This new channel was carefully engineered with attention to gradient, in-stream
features, riparian vegetation, and a host of other considerations. The new section of river,
the combined flow reach (see Figure 3), is fed by the reroute channel, where the Carmel
River was routed through the ridge separating the river from San Clemente Creek. These
features, along with the diversion dike blocking the former channel, the sediment
stockpile containing the bulk of sediments that had accumulated behind the dam, and the
stabilized sediment slope at the downstream end of the sediment stockpile comprise some
of the key design elements of the post-removal landscape.
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Herein, I focus on the post-removal landscape in order to examine the ways in
which it was shaped by social, political, and ecological values. Revisiting Davis and
Slobodkin (2004), I argue that the restoration which took place was fundamentally a
value-laden process, one which reveals further understanding as to the broader envirotechnical system pertaining to the San Clemente Dam Removal. Further, I demonstrate
the political, social, and ecological efficacy of the post-removal landscape and analyze
the landscape as one component in the enviro-technical system of the Carmel River and
Monterey Peninsula.
Towards this end, I apply the conceptual lens of techno-politics. Giving specific
attention to the political work and agency of artifacts of technology, techno-politics
describes and illuminates the values (political and social) projected into the future by
durable technological artifacts. Geographers have historically prioritized examination and
explication of the shaping of place and landscape, as well as the work landscapes do.
There is a strong parallelism, at least at a conceptual level, between my use of the technopolitical frame and a general utilization of landscape. Nevertheless, it is instructive, or at
least illuminating, to stick with the analytic metaphor of post-removal landscape as an
artifact of technology. I return to Allenby and Sarewitz’s definition of technology as a
“cause and effect machine” (2011, 36), emphasizing the intentionality of the artifact, and
the translation of knowledge and technical expertise into material form. Technology, as
opposed to landscape, implies origins rooted in invention, rather than emergence.
In examining the post-removal landscape of the San Clemente Dam as an artifact
of technology, as well as the values the post-removal landscape projects, I offer a
necessarily partial perspective—highlighting particular characteristics and phenomena
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which became apparent in the research process. I describe environmental values and two
distinct more-than-human actors (sediment and fish), using both to demonstrate how
political and social values shaped the removal project and resulting landscape. Having
then briefly described the values and actors, I subsequently assess the related dominant
discourse, identified during the research process through interviews and document
analysis. This discourse, which focused on liability, draws particular attention to the role
of sediment in the enviro-technical system. The role that sediment plays demonstrates the
potential work that the artifact (landscape) can do, in this case maintaining the status quo
for downstream property owners.

Figure 5. Photograph of the post-removal landscape (Fisher n.d.).
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Steelhead (Oncorhynchus mykiss irideus), are an anadromous form of rainbow
trout that were once prevalent from Southern California to Alaska. Currently, many
steelhead runs are threatened or endangered. In many areas, including the Carmel River,
wild populations of steelhead are supplemented or supported through measures such as
captive breeding, and trapping and storage of fish. The aforementioned Central-Southern
California Steelhead Evolutionarily Significant Unit, listed as threatened (under the
Endangered Species Act) in 1997, became a key protagonist in regional struggles over
water, the Carmel River, and dam removal.
Even before negotiations began to remove the San Clemente Dam, the issues
affecting steelhead trout had motivated or enrolled various groups of stakeholders into
watershed-level actions and struggles. Recreational anglers, represented by the Carmel
River Steelhead Association (CRSA) had long sparred with California American Water
(see California State Water Resources Control Board 2009). The National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) also had institutional and vested interest in steelhead (as
directed by the mandate to conserve, manage, and oversee decisions affecting marine
species, steelhead included) and played a critical role in driving and shaping dam removal
on the Carmel River. This role was demonstrated by their presence on the San Clemente
Dam Removal and Reroute project team and as the agency responsible for representing
the federal government with respect to this project. During the course of the removal,
steelhead’s status as a threatened species provided legal power to the NMFS, who were
able to threaten the dam owner (Cal Am) with a jeopardy decision as they sought a
Section 404 permit through the US Army Corps of Engineers (as directed by the Clean
Water Act, referenced earlier).

56
Between 1921 and 2015, the San Clemente dam presented significant
impediments for steelhead attempting to spawn upstream of the structure. Although fish
ladders were installed on the dam, consensus was that the ladder, which was perhaps the
steepest of its kind in the state, was a significant obstacle and prevented much of the
population from spawning in the upper reaches of the river. Consequently, steelhead and
the attendant issues of habitat connectivity were a decided motivating factor in pursuing
dam removal over buttressing and the species became a source of leverage for removal
advocates.
Concerns over steelhead habitat connectivity promoted changes to the specifics of
the reroute design. One interview subject related a dramatic story, where an individual
with intimate knowledge of the river and dam site entered (by surreptitious means) a
closed-door meeting in order to suggest a design alternative—namely, moving the cut in
the ridge between the San Clemente Creek and Carmel River farther upstream, whereby
effecting a longer channel within which to reroute the river. The habitat-benefit of this
longer channel, which was implemented in the final form of the design and project, was a
channel gradient more hospitable to steelhead passage. The newly constructed channel
bypassed the bulk of the sediment accumulated behind the San Clemente Dam and was
designed with steelhead passage in mind. 54 step pools were carefully engineered using
boulders in order to create a gradual passage, with deep pools backed up behind rock
ledges for the steelhead to rest in.
All of this focus on steelhead reflects the power of a single species and, more
particularly, a single ecosystem service—the river providing habitat connectivity to
facilitate spawning. Yet despite the steelhead’s importance ecologically, socially, and
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locally, the project focused only on one key ecological benefit for steelhead, namely,
habitat connectivity. According to interview subjects, the removal missed the opportunity
to replace sediments, particularly spawning gravels, which would have further benefitted
steelhead recovery in the Carmel River. One subject, a fisheries biologist involved with
the project, described his disappointment after advocating for this additional ecological
consideration:
I encouraged the technical group and the project sponsors to, at a minimum,
excavate and get some of those spawning materials that had been trapped in the
reservoir and have them passed downstream. But, they said this isn't a spawning
gravel project, this is a dam removal project. So, I was a little disappointed
because a hundred years of spawning gravel retention had occurred and as a result
we missed a great opportunity to try to get some of those materials back out, put
down them downstream. Sediment retention has caused a lot of problems
downstream. We've got channel incision in the lower 15, 16 miles of river in the
alluvial portion. And it's due to sediment retention, sediment starvation.
The decision to focus on habitat connectivity and dam removal over spawning gravel and
sediments was likely influenced by cost, logistics, and factors beyond the present scope
of analysis, but it serves to illustrate the prioritizing of certain environmental
considerations over others, indicating the social and micro-political shaping of the
project.
Beyond spawning gravels, sediment presented challenges, benefits, and political
potentialities that directly shaped other areas and aspects of the San Clemente project. In
strictly ecological terms, sediment was most immediately a concern for steelhead with
regard to spawning gravel, but simultaneously, the architects of removal voiced concerns
over the possibility of adverse consequences for steelhead if sediment accumulated
behind the dam was not carefully controlled. While some large dam removals (the Condit
and Elwah dams in Washington State, for instance), took place in such a way that
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accumulated sediment was simply allowed to wash downstream, the determination was
made that doing so on the Carmel would have significant and pervasive negative effects
on both the steelhead and California Red-legged Frog (California Department of Water
Resources 2012). The reroute option enacted as part of this project helped to mitigate
those risks.
While the spawning gravels which had accumulated behind the dam might remain a
missed opportunity, the removal of the dam will likely have the result of allowing
sediments and spawning gravel to move downstream, at least unimpeded by the San
Clemente Dam (the Los Padres Dam remains in place, upstream of the San Clemente
site). The increased sediment load in the river stands to benefit both steelhead and
downstream property owners. Multiple interview subjects speculated that increased
sediment load in the river would result in an anticipated reduction in bank incision,
whereby minimizing property lost each year to the river.
Predicted sediment impacts on property owners presented particular liabilities and
potential benefits to the human and economic elements of the enviro-technical system
post-removal. While returning the sediment regime to something closer to the river’s
reference condition might benefit property owners, there was significant attention paid,
amongst the design team and removal stakeholders, to the hypothetical impacts of the
accumulated sediment behind the dam moving downstream and affecting the lower
Carmel River. Specifically, several interview subjects indicated concerns about sediment
moving downstream causing flooding and property damage. Whether and how
(specifically) sediments affect or might have impacted these properties and property
owners is beyond the purview of this study—although there are good indications that
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interview subjects’ suppositions are accurate. Nevertheless, concerns over sediments and
liability obviously had a demonstrable effect upon the system and removal process.
Throughout my interviews, subjects discussed sediment and the risks associated
with the sediment stockpile. Adjacent to these concerns, I identified a common
“discourse of liability,” exemplified in concern over what might happen in one of several
scenarios. These hypothetical scenarios included dam removal without sequestering
sediment and the failure of the diversion dike and reroute channel, resulting in the
sediment stockpile being washed downstream. Subjects voiced that downstream property
owners did not actually indicate any real opposition to the project, but that the presence
of homes and valuable real estate in the affected area prompted particular concern. These
concerns (as related below by two government officials who worked on the project team)
manifest both in terms of downstream property owners benefiting from re-established
sediment loads:
Anyone who owns riparian property in the lower valley is a beneficiary because
the river is going to carry a heavier sediment load which is going to reduce
erosion of their property
…and also interest in the types of homes which would potentially be impacted:
We had million-dollar homes at the bottom of the river that we couldn't just allow
all of this to go down and flood out of these homes.
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Figure 6. Development in the lower Carmel River valley. Author’s photograph.

Concerns over liability and sediment also appear to have influenced a key project
component involving ownership of the former dam site. As multiple subjects explained, it
was hard to find any agency or group willing to take ownership of the land after the dam
was removed. Individuals involved with project planning described familiar concerns
over liability relating to the former dam site (in the event of dike failure, etc). Several
subjects also related an anecdote wherein Congressman Sam Farr again intervened with
respect to this issue, in order to push the project forward. The project team having
struggled to find an agency willing to take ownership of the land, and Cal Am reluctant to
retain ownership, Sam Farr reportedly exerted pressure on officials in the Bureau of Land
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Management (BLM), who eventually capitulated and agreed that the federal agency
would accept the site’s 928 acres from Cal Am. Assessing this configuration, one project
team representative explained in an interview that this transfer was justified on the basis
that the kind of event that would mobilize the sequestered sediment was of such a
significant magnitude, given the design standards of the removal and reroute, that any
such event would necessarily involve the federal government. Therefore, the likelihood
of such a catastrophic event did not significantly increase overall liability for a federal
agency like the BLM.
Under this arrangement, wherein the risk of the privately owned dam collapsing has
been eliminated, and any risk associated with failure of the reroute and post-removal
landscape transferred to the BLM, Cal Am certainly accrues obvious benefits and, in
theory, is subject to significantly less liability (discursive or otherwise). Downstream
development, historically tied to the San Clemente Dam, was also privileged and
benefited from credence given to potential property damage, represented in liability
discourse. Finally, the post-removal landscape (as shaped by the above processes)
continues to support the local political order by allowing for the profit of an investorowned utility and development patterns of costly real estate along the lower river. The
final artifact of technology, the post-removal landscape, therefore has larger political
implications, but also is subject to and caught up in micro-politics, or the strategies by
which different actors (such as the congressman, the steelhead association, NMFS, and
other agencies) exerted influence and power.
The discursive work of liability in this instance also points to the obduracy of the
San Clemente Dam. Downriver consequences (hypothetical or otherwise) stalled progress
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on the removal. In other words, the connections within the enviro-technical system—
between river, sediment, dam, and development—reduced the ability to alter the physical
structure of the dam. One interview subject, a government employee who worked on the
project team, related that Cal Am had attempted to simply transfer the dam and
surrounding land to the public agencies involved, contribute funding for removal, but
cease all other involvements with the structure and project; “to which we were like
'nobody in the world is gonna take your damn that has been declared unsafe.’”
In the end, the post-removal landscape is a technology that actualizes several goals.
It manages sediment, minimizes liability, reconnects habitats, and facilitates continued
profit generation for the utility. Both technological and ecological, the landscape was not
returned to its reference (or “natural”) condition, but was transformed to something that
shows evidence of social, political, and environmental values.
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Conclusion, Discussion, and Future Directions
Dams are, it would seem, an unusual sort of object, as difficult or more to remove
as they are to construct. When the San Clemente Dam was built, it became a part of the
enviro-technical system encompassing the Carmel River and water provision on the
Monterey Peninsula. Over the next century, the dam accrued entanglements and
connections within the system, adding to the structure’s obduracy.
The San Clemente Dam Removal involved a myriad of actors, stakeholders, and
subplots, many of which remain for future analysis. An effective, politically attentive
understanding of dam removal requires attention to both the complex array of human,
governmental, and social actors, as well as the technical, physical, non-human
dimensions involved. Given the sheer volume of actors enrolled within the context of a
single removal project, the data available to researchers may quickly become
overwhelming. As a senior federal government official, intimately involved with the
removal of the San Clemente Dam, relayed in the course of this study, “You’re not going
to find one person who knows the full scope of what happened.”
This overabundance of relevant information demands the focusing potential of an
analytical framework. In this study, I have presented a few key concepts as clarifying
tools, directing academic attention toward the physical artifacts involved in the removal
project. I argue that it is not enough to acknowledge that the dam and the post-removal
landscape were “shaped” by political forces, or that they had some “effects” on people
and the biophysical river. In order to effectively investigate these elements, they must be
considered as artifacts imbued with politics and enrolled in enviro-technical systems.
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The porous enviro-technical system into which the dam was built changed and
developed around the dam, adding connections and linkages between the structure and
human and more-than-human actors. Continued development in the area taxed the
available drinking water, as new properties and golf courses were built along the lower
river. Meanwhile, sediments accumulated behind the dam as fire and other disturbance
events affected the surrounding forest. Simultaneously, systems of governance (which
had formerly either not existed or not yet reached the dam) came to encompass the
structure—the California Department of Water Resources, The California Public Utilities
Commission, The US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Marine Fisheries
service all grew in jurisdiction, to eventually include the dam.
Politics, the struggle for recognition or the ability to exert outsized influence, is
implicated throughout the dam’s timeline and historical developments, manifesting in a
variety of scales, means, and venues. At a fundamental level, the dam itself was built
with inherent politics. Perhaps most relevantly, it projected certain environmental issues
(and thereby values) into the future and, for most of its service life, without a plan to
address the material consequences of the aging structure. Impacts to steelhead remain
among the most visible effects of the dam, and the political implications of those effects
are illustrated through other stakeholder groups’ responses to dwindling fish stocks. The
Carmel River Steelhead Association was established as a direct response to degradation
of the river and dwindling numbers of fish, and the subsequent conflicts and legal clashes
between the Association and California American Water demonstrate struggles for
influence over the river.
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Impacts to steelhead, characterized by low flows in the river, retention of
spawning gravels behind the dam, and impeded fish passage at the San Clemente Dam,
also enrolled or compelled the engagement of the National Marine Fisheries Service in
the river’s governance. In the history of the dam, we see politically significant contests
and maneuvers between the NMFS and Cal Am, particularly in the decade prior to 2010.
Some of the environmental impacts related to steelhead, and their associated political
struggles, are somewhat ancillary to the issue of dam removal. For instance, low flows in
the river and water scarcity on the Monterey Peninsula in the years following 2003 (when
the dam last provided any drinking water), had only indirect impacts on the removal
process. Nevertheless, those issues (and the political contests they helped engender) were
all within the same enviro-technical system, encompassing the dam, river, and water
provision to the Monterey Peninsula.
The San Clemente Dam’s inherent politics also manifest through its historical
connection to development in the region. The dam was part of the material,
infrastructural network of private water provision, an organization which itself implies a
political order and sets the region apart from most of the State of California and the
broader American West. This arrangement was closely linked to the development of
tourism and real estate throughout the twentieth century.
Beyond the inherent politics of the dam, the process by which the technological
practice of removal came to the Carmel River demonstrates noteworthy political
implications and shaping. The work of translating removal technology to the local
context features adjustments to meet or balance political perspectives. The difficult
negotiations which preceded removal highlight the work of different stakeholder groups
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and episodes. For instance, the importance that NMFS put on steelhead habitat
connectivity (enforced through their Section 7 mandate), highlights how the particular
political landscape of the dam, river, and enviro-technical system shaped the removal
process.
Despite the multitude of motivations and supporters for removal, the dam was a
decidedly obdurate artifact. The dam’s material qualities, its mass and size, made its
removal an engineering challenge. The structure was also networked within a complex,
porous system. As Hommels (2015) points out (albeit in a different scholarly context),
this networking and the linkages between system elements are a key explanatory
framework for obduracy. The network, in this case, is understood as the enviro-technical
system. Following Pritchard’s (2011) model, the enviro-technical system of the San
Clemente Dam is composed of technological (water infrastructure in the region),
environmental (the Carmel River ecosystem), social (residents and developments), and
political (the array of interest groups) elements. Understanding the composition and basic
functions of this enviro-technical system helps to demonstrate why the removal process
took decades to overcome the dam’s basic obduracy.
That effort, or the process of overcoming the dam’s obduracy also shows distinct
episodes where politics came into play and shaped the project—most visibly with respect
to micro-political strategies between different stakeholders and interest groups. Tactics
such as the preferencing of different engineering plans, and negotiations over funding fall
under this rubric. The influence of politics on the project is also apparent through
consideration of the removal’s beneficiaries and the political order that it helps to
support. As I explored through the mechanisms of funding, the San Clemente Removal
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perpetuated a sometimes-contested arrangement whereby an investor-owned utility
benefited through a public-private partnership, largely funded through rate increases on
its constituents.
Although the original research design for this study included discourse analysis as
a critical component, no strong link was established between discourse and politics in the
course of study. Nevertheless, I did identify one relevant discourse (around risk and
liability), that significantly shaped the project. While the political significance of liability
discourses was not as prominent as other topics of analysis, it nevertheless made some
impact on the design of the reroute and removal, represented in the post-removal
landscape. As an artifact of technology, the post-removal landscape shows the influence
of social and political values as well as a propensity to function in support of those same
values. Concern for downstream properties weighed heavily on the design, as did
particular environmental services, namely habitat connectivity for steelhead.
While this artifact (and the technology of dam removal) sometimes made it into
the public consciousness or popular press, most of the political processes I have outlined
took place out of the view of the public. The public was involved at various stages, and
several agencies took real steps towards raising public awareness or soliciting feedback,
but the negotiations, strategies, and machinations which form the bulk of my analysis
were primarily conducted between a relatively small number of agents. Future research
would, therefore, do well to examine these negotiations, or similar projects, through the
academic lens of post-politics (see Anderson et al. 2016, Swyngedouw and Wilson 2014).
Furthermore, the future analyses of similar projects could also include ongoing work on
the removal site as well as a more thorough examination of local water issues.
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Having established some of the means by which politics figure into dam removal,
future work on this, or similar case studies would also benefit by asking more detailed
research questions. It would be particularly interesting to consider a more detailed
analysis of who benefits from dam removal, how they benefit, and through what
processes, following the recent prompting of Grabowski et al. (2017). Further, I suggest
that the question of “who benefits” via dam removal also implies the question of “who
loses’”, or from whom benefits are accrued. Loftus et al. (2016) have demonstrated the
role of water infrastructure (in their case household water meters) in creating financial
subjectivities. Although contextually removed, a more detailed study of the San Clemente
case, focusing on the role of investor-owned utility Cal Am, or dam removal and dam
owners more generally, might yield significant insights into the power relationship
between dam owners and ratepayers.
Research into these topics could potentially benefit from the sort of discourse
analysis I originally proposed for this study. One drawback to the research design for this
project seems to have been in looking for discourse around events that had already
occurred, mostly out of the view of the public. What discourse I found was not quite so
active, nor did it appear to be actively supporting current regimes of truth or project
components. Instead, my research revealed a rich history of obduracy and envirotechnical systems, which I have chosen to include in this case study.
Finally, future research might also consider in more depth questions about the end
of service life for artifacts such as dams. As I have worked to demonstrate in this study,
the political implications and efficacy of the San Clemente Dam did not neatly end as the
dam ceased to function. Rather, the process of addressing the aging structure, mitigating
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the hazards it posed, and altering its ecological impacts was wrought with politics. In
particular, the politics of removal funding, which in the case of the San Clemente Dam
were of demonstrated political significance, may provide an avenue for understanding the
full spectrum of politics as manifest in dams. More broadly, social science and
geographic research might consider the undoing of infrastructure along the same lines.
What does it then say about the nature of technology and infrastructure that the
cost of dam can be passed from dam owners to the public? The San Clemente Dam was a
privately owned asset, and yet the removal project was funded by ratepayers and
taxpayers. Rarely, it seems, do we consider the end-of-life for artifacts of technology as
they are produced. The politics of funding may prove a compelling means to address
broader questions of de-growth, de-industrialization (or re-industrialization) and similar
processes where society confronts obduracy, obsolescence, or the politics projected
though time by aging infrastructure.
This study has examined the role and work of politics in dam removal. By
considering the enviro-technical system within which the San Clemente dam was built,
the structure’s inherent politics and obduracy, as well as the work of politics through and
after the removal process, I have attempted to present a comprehensive view of the
politics of dam removal. This historically attentive perspective on removal made visible
several instances of politics and political shaping. Given the significance of the dam and
Carmel River to the Monterey Peninsula, the work of politics in this dam removal project
has a decided regional relevance. Beyond the San Clemente Dam, we will continue to
face questions about the fate of aging dams and other works of infrastructure.
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Understanding the work of power and politics will, I believe, remain an important task as
we answer these questions.
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Appendix: Semi-Structured Interview Questions
•

Would you mind introducing yourself and briefly describe your position and
organization?
o What kind of work does your organization do?

•

Please describe your connection to the removal of the San Clemente Dam .
o How did you come to be involved with this project?
o How did your agency, group, or organization come to be involved with
this project?

•

Can you describe how the project played out or unfolded?
o Were there any moments or events you might consider especially
significant?
o Why or why not?

•

Are there any details of the project you think are worth highlighting?
o Why do you feel these details are important?

•

How would you describe the public’s access to information about the project?
o How would you describe your information?

•

How much influence do you feel you (or your organization/agency) had over the
project?
o Were there any strategies your employed in order to exert more influence?

•

Which parties or interest groups do you believe had the most influence over the
way the project took place?
o Were there parties you think should have had more influence or less
influence?
o Was this influence contentious/controversial in any way?
o How do you feel this influence was won or lost?

•

Did you feel there were political dimensions to this removal?
o Can you describe those dimensions?

•

How would you characterize the interactions between private interests (dam
owner, etc.) and public interests?
o Can you comment on the way the funding of the project was handled?

•

Can you comment on the design of the removal and the re-route?
o What do you think led to the reroute option (as opposed to other removal
options)?
o What do you think determined the form of the removal?
§ Social issues? Environmental Concerns?
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•

Who do you believe were the ultimate beneficiaries, now that the project has been
completed?
o Were there specific interests or viewpoints that lost out?

•

What were your feelings about the dam (pre-removal)?
o What did the dam represent to you?

•

What do you believe the dam removal and reroute accomplished?

•

At any point, did you (or your group/agency/etc) experience resistance or conflict
with others?
o Can you describe the terms of the conflict or the points of contention?

•

What do you believe was the strongest motivation/driver for the project?

•

Were you supportive of the removal project?
o Why/why not?
o Were you always supportive of/against removal or did your position
change at some point?

•

Anything else you want to add:

